In this paper we consider the one-way function f g;N (X) = g X (modN), where N is a Blum integer. We prove that under the commonly assumed intractability of factoring Blum integers, all its bits are individually hard, and the lower as well as upper halves of them are simultaneously hard. As a result, f g;N can be used in e cient pseudo-random bit generators and multi-bit commitment schemes, where messages can be drawn according to arbitrary probability distributions.
1 is a generator of Z P ( BM] ). Its inverse is the discrete logarithm function, for which no e cient algorithms have been found. Another problem that is considered to be highly intractable is that of factoring a number which is the product of two large primes. Among the one-way functions that are based on the di culty of factoring are the RSA / Rabin functions ( RSA] , Ra]), as well as the quadratic residuosity problem and its related root extracting function ( BBS] ).
An interesting property of one-way functions is the existence of hard bits in the argument which cannot be computed by any family of polynomial-size Boolean circuits with 1/2+1/poly probability of success. This notion was extensively investigated in the early 1980's, culminating in proofs that some speci c bits in these number theoretic functions (usually the most signi cant or the least signi cant O(log n) bits of the n-bit argument) are individually hard ( BM] , ACGS] , BBS]), and that those O(log n) bits are also simultaneously hard ( LW] , ACGS] , VV]). All the subsequent e orts to extend the techniques to prove the individual or simultaneous security of O(n) bits in these number theoretic functions failed.
Goldreich and Levin GL] have shown that for every one-way function there is a logarithmic number of one-bit predicates that are hard, given the value of the function. Extending their result to prove that more bits are hard without imposing any assumptions on the one-way function is conjectured to be impossible, since a function may be one-way and still depend only on a small fraction of its bits. Explicit constructions of one-way functions for which all the bits are secure do exist, but they rely on the composition of hard bits from many one-way functions (rather than on a single application of a natural function, e.g. in the probabilistic encryption functions of GM], BG]).
Besides its theoretical signi cance, proving a one-way function to have many simultaneously hard bits can improve the e ciency of many cryptographic schemes. Very recently Impagliazzo and Naor ( IN] ) have introduced an e cient pseudo-random bit generator based on the combinatorial one-way function corresponding to the subset sum problem. Their novel construction makes it possible to obtain O(n) pseudo-random output bits from each application of the function on random inputs, but does not necessarily imply that the input bits of the function are individually or simultaneously hard, leaving the problem of constructing a natural function with O(n) secure bits open.
In this paper we consider the well known one-way function f g;N (X) = g X (modN), where N is a Blum integer. We prove that under the sole assumption that factoring Blum integers is di cult, all its bits are individually hard, and the lower and upper halves of them are simultaneously hard. As a result, f g;N can be used in e cient pseudo-random bit generators with O(n)-bit output per stage and in multi-bit commitment schemes, in which the messages can be drawn according to arbitrary probability distributions.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we give the various denitions and assumptions used. In section 3 we deal with the individual bits security of f g;N and in section 4 with the simultaneous bit security. We present some applications of our enhanced security results in section 5 and discuss several extensions of our work in section 6.
Preliminaries
Let N = P Q, where P, Q are distinct odd primes, and let n be the binary size of N. Let Z N be the multiplicative group containing the elements in 1; N] that are relatively prime to N. The order of an element g 2 Z N , ord N (g), is the smallest c 1 such that g c = 1 (modN). We denote max g2Z N ford N (g)g by O N . Clearly:
O N = lcm(P ? 1; Q ? 1) (P ? 1)(Q ? 1) 2 :
We refer to any g as a generator despite the fact that no g can generate all the elements in Z N for N which is the product of two odd primes.
De nition: For a given g let G Z N be the set of elements generated by it, i.e.:
Proposition 1:
Let P and Q be randomly chosen primes of equal size, N = P Q with binary size n, and g a randomly chosen element in Z N , then:
Pr ord N (g) < 1 n k (P ? Let m = dn=2e denote the binary size of P and Q. Let X = 2 m ? 1.
We shall rst examine the sum of the gcd of all pairs of m-bit numbers: P X=2 R 1 ;R 2 X gcd(R 1 ; R 2 ). Obviously:
We are interested in R 1 ; R 2 of the form P ? 1; Q ? 1. As the density of primes in the interval X=2; X] is known to be O(X= log X) (by an extension of Heath-Brown to the Prime Numbers Theorem GK]), the lemma follows. Following is a list of the assumptions that are used throughout this paper. Unless otherwise mentioned, we shall assume that all these assumptions hold, even though some of our results can be derived without some of them.
Assumption a.1: P and Q are of equal size.
This assumption is commonly used in cryptography, and is believed to strengthen the intractability of factorization.
Assumption a.2: P = Q = 3 (mod 4). If the assumption holds, every square in Z N has exactly one square root that is also a square. Hence, squaring is a permutation of the quadratic residues. The numbers N = P Q for which both assumptions hold are called Blum integers.
Assumption a.3: g is a quadratic residue.
We refer to any g for which assumption a.3 holds as an admissible generator. Note that Proposition 1 holds even if we restrict N to be a Blum integer and g to be an admissible generator.
Intractability assumption Y]:
No family of polynomial-size Boolean circuits can factor a polynomial fraction of the Blum integers.
Note: All our assumptions and results use the non-uniform approach to complexity, i.e. are stated in terms of polynomial-size Boolean circuits. However, most of them can be stated, without any changes, in terms of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. The only case, where an adjustment is required, is in the proof of Theorem 7, as indicated there.
Under the intractability assumption, the exponentiation modulo a Blum integer, f g;N (X), is a one-way function.
Proof:
We present the simple proof of this theorem as it demonstrates some of the basic techniques that are crucial for our results. We establish that it is possible to plant a short yet hard secret inside the argument of f g;N , and use that fact extensively in the sequel.
De ne Y = g N (modN) = f g;N (N). Let S = f ?1 g;N (Y ) Notations: For a number U let u n :::u 1 denote the binary representation of U, with u n being the most signi cant bit and u 1 being the least signi cant bit. Note that most signi cant bit always refers to the n-th bit in the binary representation, even when U ranges over a smaller interval of possible values. A substring u k :::u j of u n :::u 1 (1 j < k n) will be denoted by u k j . We use the notation f < O( (n)) for any function that vanishes faster than any polynomial, i.e. for every polynomial poly(n) and n large enough f < 1=poly(n).
3 The Hard Bits of f g;N (x) De nition H.1: The i-th bit of the function f g;N is hard if no family of polynomial-size Boolean circuits can, given a random admissible triplet (g, N, Z), compute the i-th bit of f ?1 g;N (Z) with probability of success greater than 1=2 + 1=poly(n), for any polynomial poly(n). Note that we use the direct de nition of hardness (as in BM]) rather than de ning a bit to be hard if its approximation is as hard as computing f ?1
The above well known de nition of hardness is valid only for unbiased bits. However, proving the security of the O(log n) most signi cant bits of f g;N calls for a new de nition of hardness for bits that are a-priori known to be biased (and therefore can be trivially predicted with probability greater that 1=2). Let x i be the i-th input bit of the function f g;N and denote its bias towards 0 by b(i). Note that only for i n?O(log n) the bias is signi cantly greater than 1=2, yet the de nition we give is valid for any bias. To make the conditional probabilities well de ned we must require C to be non-constant, i.e. output 0 and 1 with probabilities greater than 0. As is explained in SS1] this does not detract from the generality of the de nition, since a constant circuit can only discover deviations from the overall bias. (Y ) and following the reduction of Theorem 2. In the following we discuss the general techniques and procedures that are implemented in performing the extraction of S using C. Dealing with the most signi cant (biased) bits of f g;N , imposes several additional di culties, that are of a less general nature. This analysis of the hardness of the biased bits is given in full in the proof of Proposition 3.4.
Intuitively, we can regard an oracle for the i-th bit as a one-bit window into the i-th position in a long unknown sequence of bits. By moving the sequence underneath the window, we can see everything in it. We therefore need a method to shift the unknown S to the right and to the left, by operating on the known Y . We should be careful not to cause a wraparound (i.e. a reduction of the shifted S modulo the unknown ord N (g)), by zeroing some known bits of S while operating on Y . The shifts to the left result essentially from squaring Y . We cannot perform the shifts to the right by extracting square roots of Y , since that cannot be done in polynomial time when the factorization of N is unknown. Instead we develop a special technique by which the right shifts result from changing the base g of the exponentiation function, and using the fact that squaring modulo a Blum integer is a permutation over the (randomly chosen) admissible generators.
As the oracle may err, one peek through the window in not enough. We 'collect votes' on the value of the i-th bit by querying the oracle on polynomially many random multiples of the original input, and use a majority vote to decide the value. To perform this randomization we have to guess an estimate of the unknown ord N (g) as an upper bound on the random choices, thus preventing the occurrence of a wraparound. Since the multiplication involves the addition of the known exponent of the random value with the unknown argument of f g;N , we should handle with care the unknown carry into the i-th bit position from the addition of their least signi cant i?1 bits. We solve the problem by guessing the value of a logarithmic number of bits right to the i-th bit and zeroing them. A straightforward implementation of this guessing strategy for each bit position leads to an exponential algorithm, but a more careful implementation can make sure that only a polynomial number of candidates for the value of S exist.
We begin the proof with a detailed description of the bit-zeroing, shifting and randomization techniques, which provide us with the necessary tools for extracting S. We then separate the proof into four possible cases and show:
1. The middle bits (dn=2e ? O(log n) i dn=2e + O(log n)) are hard (Proposition 3.1).
2. Every bit to the right of the middle (1 i dn=2e ? O(log n)) is hard (Proposition 3.2). 3. Every non-biased bit to the left of the middle (dn=2e + O(log n) i n ? O(log n) is hard (Proposition 3.3).
4. The O(log n) most signi cant bits of f g;N are hard (Proposition 3.4). The actual extraction of S in this theorem involves two possible procedures. The simpler is the Forward-Extract procedure, where the unknown bits of S are computed from the right (least signi cant) to the left. The more complicated is the Backward-Extract procedure, where the bits are discovered from the left to the right. We describe both procedures in detail while proving Proposition 3.1. We use a simpli ed version of procedure Forward-Extract in the proof of Proposition 3.2. A very careful application of procedure Backward-Extract is required for the proofs of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4.
Assumptions a.2 and a.3 on P, Q and g are required to enable performing the general right shifts technique that we develop. However, as we shall demonstrate, the use of this technique is necessary only when the oracle is located to the right of the middle. As a result Propositions 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 can be strengthened to hold without assumptions a.2 and a.3.
We shall henceforth assume that the randomly chosen g is of high order and perform our analysis accordingly. More speci cally we assume that: ord N (g) 32 n 4c+4 (P ? 1)(Q ? 1) The probability that g is not of high order is by Proposition 1 O( 1=n 4c=3 )) and since the oracle has an overall 1=n c advantage in predicting correctly the i-th bit of f g;N (for any g), by our choice of the order it has at least a 1=2n c advantage in predicting correctly the i-th bit for high order g's. For notational simplicity let = 4c + 4. We express most quantities in terms of , even when smaller quantities can be used.
In many of our procedures we need a fairly accurate guess on the order of g. Since all we need is a logarithmic number of signi cant digits we can try all possibilities and still remain polynomial time. Let o n :::o 1 be the binary representation of ord N (g) and let o m be the leftmost non-zero bit of ord N (g). We assume from now on the we know the value of m and of o m?j for j = 1; : : : ; d log ne. Main Techniques:
Let V = f g;N (U), for U ord N (g). Note that u j = 0 for m + 1 j n.
Bit-Zeroing Technique:
The operation of zeroing a known j-th bit of U (while operating on V ) is denoted by ZR j (g; V ). It is easy to see that:
ZR j (g; V ) = V g ?u j 2 j?1 (modN) Shifting Techniques: Shifting to the left: Assume we are guaranteed that u m = 0, and we know u m?1 . We shift the sequence of bits u m?1 :::u 1 one bit to the left, while zeroing the new m-th bit of the shifted U, by using the knowledge of m and u m?1 to transform V into (ZR m?1 (g; V )) Shifting to the right: We can shift the sequence of bits representing U one bit to the right, with the known least signi cant bit falling o , by transforming V into q ZR 1 (V ) (modN), under an appropriate choice of one of the four possible square roots. However, square roots modulo N cannot be e ciently computed without knowledge of the factorization of N, so we have to compute it in an indirect way.
Assume now that g was not arbitrarily chosen, but created by squaring mod N another admissible generator g 0 . Let V 0 = f g 0 ;N (U): Using the knowledge of V 0 and of the least signi cant bit of U we get:
shifted U = f ?1 g;N (ZR 1 (g 0 ; V 0 )) As V 0 depends on U, if U is unknown V 0 is also unknown. However, since we only use the technique to obtain shifts of S = f ? Observe that we only use g 0 to calculate square roots. All the queries to the oracle are with respect to the same original g.
We can use this method to perform a bounded number of shifts to the right. In order to perform at most k shifts to the right, we prepare in advance the sequence: fg j g k+1 j=0 , where g j = g 2 j?1 (modN), and use g = g k+1 as the base of the exponentiation function. Since squaring is a permutation of the quadratic residues modulo a Blum integer N, a random choice of g 0 will produce a random admissible g for any k.
Randomization Technique:
We perform the randomization by querying the oracle on t(n) = n 2c+3 inputs of the form: (g, N, V g R ) for randomly chosen n-bit R = r n :::r 1 such that 0 R < ord N (g). We then determine the value of u i by a majority vote. Two main problems arise:
1. Despite our knowledge of R, we cannot know whether a carry from the addition of the i ? 1 least signi cant bits of the known R and the unknown U e ects the i-th bit of the sum, and thus we cannot infer u i from the answers of the oracle for the i-th bit. If, on the other hand, we were guaranteed that u i?1 :::u i?d log ne = 000:::0, we could discard the possibility of a carry except in the low probability event that r i?1 :::r i?d log ne = 111:::1 (whose probability is at most 1=n Note: The shifts to the right in the above procedure move S back at most to its initial position but not further to the right. Therefore it is possible to perform the right shifts directly without using the general shift to the right technique. An e cient implementation of these right shifts involves saving the intermediate results of the initial shifts to the left and reusing them. The same holds also for all the other procedures that are used when the oracle is located left to the middle. For this reason, Propositions 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 can be strengthened to hold without assumptions a.2 and a.3, as we have already indicated.
The following scheme illustrates the position of S during the procedure, given an oracle for the (dn=2e + 1)-th bit. We denote an unknown value of a bit by a question mark. All bits that are known a-priori to be zero are denoted by a zero. Bits of S that were discovered or assigned values and subsequently zeroed are denoted by an exclamation mark. The oracle's location is indicated by a box. Proof: Consider the following two conditions:
1. For the particular choice of N and g, the probability (over R) that the oracle gives the correct answer is at least 1=2 + 1=2n c . 2. The order of g is at least N=n .
We claim that whenever these two conditions are satis ed a correct value of S will be derived with a probability that is exponentially close to 1. We leave this routine veri cation to the reader. Now observe that since the overall probability that the oracle is correct is 1=2 + 1=n c the probability (over g and N) that 1. will happen is at least 1=2n c . On the other hand by Proposition 1 we know that the probability of 2. not happening is at most 1=n 4c=3 and the claim follows. Claim 1.3: The above procedure can be used to factor a non-negligible fraction of the Blum integers with an overwhelming probability of success, by trying random admissible g's. This follows from the two other claims.
We now present the Backward-Extract procedure. In this procedure the bits of S are discovered from the most signi cant bit to the least signi cant bit. The main property of the procedure, which makes it essential for the proofs dealing with the left bits, is that at any stage of its application all the bits left to the oracle's location are known. The current procedure is applicable only when the oracle's location is logarithmically close to the middle but can be modi ed to work for all bits to the left of the middle (see the proofs of Propositions 3.3 and 3.4).
Let i = minfdn=2e + 1; ig, and let denote concatenation. Following is a description of the Backward-Extract procedure:
The Backward-Extract Procedure:
1 . From a rough analysis of the procedure it seems possible for each candidate value CS j k to be extended in two di erent ways (by concatenating both s i?j = 0 and s i?j = 1 to its right). This seemingly doubles the length of the list in every stage and causes an exponential blow-up in the number of candidate values. In fact every candidate value CS j k is uniquely de ned in terms of j and k: We perform the left shifts without zeroing the bits that were discovered, and all the di erent trials for the evaluation of s i?j are done on the same transformed value of Y , Y j . Thus a certain candidate CS j+1 v (with v = k d log ne?1 1 b) can be generated either from candidate value CS j k with k d log ne = 1 or from a candidate value with k d log ne = 0 but not from both, since we use the guess v to determine explicitly the value of k d log ne = s i?j and thus evaluate the guess k. Repeating this argument we see that each string CS j k has a unique extension to the right. It is therefore easy to see that claims 1.1-1.3 hold for the Backward-Extract procedure as well. Observe that it is crucial to this uniqueness argument that we do not zero the bits that have passed under the oracle's location.
The following scheme illustrates the position of S during the procedure,
given an oracle for the (dn=2e + 1)-th bit (i.e. i = dn=2e + 1). We denote an unknown value of a bit by a question mark. All bits that are known a-priori to be zero are denoted by a zero. Bits of S that were discovered or assigned values are denoted by an exclamation mark. The oracle's location is indicated by a box. Before the procedure begins:
After stages 2:
During the procedure: Proof Assume that for some 1 i dn=2e ? O(log n), the i-th bit is not hard. For all cases where i < dn=2e ? d log ne we use a simpli ed version of procedure Forward-Extract. (Otherwise Proposition 3.1 still holds). As we shift S i bits to the left (stage 1 of Forward-Extract, where i substitutes the (dn=2e?d log ne)-shift), we know that all the i?1 least signi cant bits are 0.
We can therefore extract the successive bits of S, by repeatedly performing stages 3-4 of procedure Forward-Extract for all bits s j , 1 j dn=2e + 1.
In this simpli ed version we need not try out all possible values of the least signi cant bits of S, whereas in Proposition 3.1 some of the bits of S remain to the oracle's right after the initial shift so that an exhaustive search cannot be avoided.
To make the right shifts possible (after the rst i shifts which merely move S back to its original position, but leave dn=2e ? i + 1 of the bits of S unknown) we must use the general right shift technique. We choose a random g 0 , create fg i g dn=2e?i+2
i=0 with g i+1 = g 2 i (modN) and use g = g dn=2e?i+2 as the base of the exponentiation function. Since by assumption a.2 squaring is a permutation over the admissible generators, randomly choosing g 0 will result in a random g, thus ensuring that the oracle is correct for g with a non-negligible probability. By the same arguments as before we get: Claim 2.1: The Simpli ed Forward-Extract procedure yields a single value for S. Claim 2.2: With probability at least (1=n c ) the value output is the correct value of S. Claim 2.3: The procedure can be used to factor a non-negligible fraction of the Blum integers with an overwhelming probability of success, by trying random admissible g 0 's.
Proposition 3.3:
Under the intractability assumption, for every i : dn=2e + O(log n) i n ? O(log n) the i-th bit of f g;N is hard. Proof: Assume that for some dn=2e + O(log n) i < n ? O(log n), the i-th bit is not hard. Again we use the answers of an oracle for that i-th bit to derive S and subsequently factor N. For non-extreme left bits (i.e. for dn=2e i (1 ? ")n, for any constant ") it is possible to use the ForwardExtract procedure to extract successive "n-bit blocks of S, as demonstrated in SS2]. This method cannot be extended to arbitrary left i's. Instead we must use the Backward-Extract procedure.
Our rst presentation of the Backward-Extract procedure was for an oracle located at the middle. We performed the left shifts without zeroing the recently discovered bits and ensured (by limiting the amount of left shifts that were performed) that this did not cause an over ow. In some cases this limitation required us to guess a logarithmic number of bits of S. In this proposition the oracle is located in an arbitrary left location so that limiting the amount of left shifts (as done in Proposition 3.1) will leave many (too many to guess) bits of S unseen by the oracle. Here we must perform the left shifts as in the general shift to the left technique and zero some bits. This makes it no longer clear that the length of the lists L j , containing the candidate values for the j left bits of S, does not grow exponentially, and hence we need a new way of trimming the list. Let l 1 ; :::; l denote the elements of the list L j ordered from the largest l 1 to the smallest l . (Note that each number in the list is smaller than 2 j ? 1.) We shall demonstrate how to handle the list in such a way that at every stage j of the Backward-Extract procedure it is still the case that l 1 ? l 2 d log ne . To do this we show how to trim L j whenever 2 d log ne < l 1 ? l 2 d log ne+1 .
The key idea of the trimming is to check a certain bit of another secret S 0 , which is de ned by:
De ne the crucial position by cp = dn=2e?j + 2d log ne+1 (its importance will soon be evident). We now make two observations, which lead us to the following rule by which we trim L j : S, then S 0 = 2 2d log ne+dn=2e+1?j + where 0 2 d log ne 2 dn=2e+1?j . Therefore: s 0 cp = 1, s 0 q = 0 for q > cp, and also s 0 cp?1 :::s 0 cp?d log ne = 0:::0. These two observations together with a standard sampling argument imply that with high probability we will never discard a correct value and hence by similar arguments as before we can prove: Assume that for some m ? c log n ? 1 i m the i-th bit is not hard by de nition H.2. We will use the same outline of the reconstruction of S as in Proposition 3.3, i.e. we will use the oracle to determine if the shifted S 0 is a number of the form or 2 i?1 + where 0 < 2 i?1?d log ne (if it is of neither form we do not care what happens). Problems arise since it is no longer true that asking the oracle questions about numbers of the form R + shifted S 0 for a randomly chosen R between 0 and e will allow us to distinguish the two cases.
By SS1] the fact that there is an oracle for which the weighted success rate is signi cantly greater than 2 (proving the bit to be weak by de nition H.2) implies that there is another oracle for which the probabilities of correct 1-answers and of erroneous 1-answers signi cantly di er. For this oracle C there exists some constant c such that: jPr(C = 1jx i = 1) ? Pr(C = 1jx i = 0)j 1 n c Let I be the entire interval 0; e] and for any interval J let P 1 (J) the fraction of 1-answers the oracle gives on J. Let J + a denote the interval J shifted a. For natural reasons we will be working modulo e. We will need the following key lemma:
Lemma 4.1: If we know an interval J of length at least d such that jP 1 (J)? P 1 (J + 2 i?1 )j 20d ?1 2 i?1?d log ne then we can recover S.
Proof: Assume without loss of generality that P 1 (J) ? P 1 (J + 2 i?1 ) 20d ?1 2 i?1?d log ne . We will use the same procedure as in Proposition 3.3. The only di erence is that instead of choosing a random R < e we will choose a random R in J. We need only to check that the oracle will be able to distinguish the two extreme cases. If l 1 contains the correct leftmost non-zero bits of S then the shifted S 0 is of the form 2 i?1 + where 0 2 i?1?d log ne . Thus when we choose R from J, R + shifted S 0 lies in an interval whose symmetric di erence with J + 2 i?1 is of size at most 2 i?d log ne . Thus the expected fraction of 1-answers in this case is at most P 1 (J + 2 i?1 ) + 1 d 2 i?d log ne . Similarly we get that if l contains the correct value for the left bits of S then we will get the answer 1 with probability at least P 1 (J) ? 1 d 2 i?d log ne . By assumption we can tell these two cases apart if we sample n (P 1 (J) ? P 1 (J + 2 i?1 )) ?2 times.
The proof will in fact proceed by identifying a polynomial number of intervals such that Lemma 4.1 will be true for one of these intervals. This interval can then be identi ed by sampling and then used in the Trimming Rule.
Divide I into K = b e 2 i?1 c + 1 intervals I 1 ; I 2 : : : I K where I j = (j ? 1)2 i?1 ; j2 i?1 ] for j < K and I K = (K ? 1)2 i?1 ; e]. We have two cases:
1. There is a j < K ? 1 such that jP 1 (I j ) ? P 1 (I j+1 )j n ?c 20K . 2. There is no such j.
In case 1 we are done by Lemma 4.1 (since K is only polynomially large) and we only have to worry about case 2. The failure of 1 implies that there is a q such that for all j < K, jP 1 (I j Lemma 4.2: For any two points a 1 and a 2 we have jf a 1 ? f a 2 j 2. Proof: Since we are working modulo e we are basically on the circle and we have no problems with the border. The size of the circle is e which by de nition equals (K ? 1)2 i?1 + jI K j. We establish the lemma by using the following two claims: Claim 4.3: If a 1 a 2 mod 2 i?1 then jf a 1 ? f a 2 j 1. Claim 4.4: If a 2 < a 1 < a 2 + 2 i?1 then f a 1 ? f a 2 1.
The lemma clearly follows from these two claims.
To see the rst claim assume that a 1 = a 2 + k2 i?1 where 0 < k < K ? 1. Then it is true that a 2 2 I j 0 K i a 1 2 I j 0 +k K and since it is not hard to see that neither of the points is in the intermediate intervals the claim follows. Examining the new division of I into T intervals I j K , that we have de ned, we again have two cases:
1. There is a j such that j < T such that jP 1 (I j K ) ? P 1 (I j+1 K )j n ?c 20T . 2. There is no such j. In case 1 we are again done by Lemma 4.1 (T is large but still polynomially bounded) and all that remains is to prove that 2 cannot happen. The fact that no j satisfying 1 exists implies that jP 1 (I j K ) ? P 1 (I K )j n ?c =20 for all j. Now consider P 1 (I): It is a weighted average of the P 1 (I j ) and thus j(P 1 (I)?qj 1 2 jP 1 (I K )?qj+n ?c =20 (using the assumption that jI K j 1 2 jIj).
On the other hand by Lemma 4.2 if we pick a random j and then pick a random point from I j K then each point is picked with a probability that is within a factor (1 + corresponding bit to be relatively weak either to the right or to the left. The well known technique of constructing these oracles is explained in BH] and is therefore omitted.
For biased bits, where de nition H.5 should be used, the proof of this equivalence is given in SS1] and is also omitted.
Theorem 5: Under the intractability assumption, the dn=2e + O(log n) right hand bits of f g;N are simultaneously hard.
Theorem 6: Under the intractability assumption, the dn=2e + O(log n) left hand bits of f g;N are simultaneously hard.
Proof of Theorem 5:
It su ces to show that every right hand bit of f g;N is relatively hard to the right by de nition H.4. In general, even if each bit is individually hard, it does not immediately imply the simultaneous hardness of all bits: In order to use an oracle for a relatively weak to the right i-th bit, all the i ? 1 least signi cant bits of the unknown value must be supplied too, a very hard task in general. However, careful analysis of the Forward-Extract procedure shows that such a task is possible.
Let X = f ?1 g;N (Z). Assume that the theorem is false, i.e. for some 1 i dn=2e + O(log n) there exists an oracle C(g; N; Z; x i?1 1 ) (for admissible triplets) that succeeds in predicting x i with probability 1=2+", for some nonnegligible ". We extract the bits of S = f ? We rst deal with the non-biased left hand bit of f g;N , (up to the O(log n) most signi cant bits). As in Theorem 5, it su ces to show that every non-biased left hand bit of f g;N is relatively hard to the left by de nition H.4. Let X = f ?1 g;N (Z). Assume that the theorem is false, i.e. for some dn=2e ? O(log n) i n ? O(log n) there exists an oracle C(g; N; Z; x n i+1 ) (for admissible triplets) that succeeds in predicting x i with probability 1=2+", for some non-negligible ". By examining the proof of Proposition 3.3 it seems plausible to use the Backward-Extract procedure combined with the Trimming Rule, since that ensures that before the randomization is performed all the bits left to the oracle's location are zero. Therefore it seems that the left bits that should be supplied to the oracle in every query are simply the left bits of the exponent of the random multiplier. Unfortunately that is not true! During the randomization we ensure that with high probability no carry reaches the oracle's location. However there may be a carry from the i-th bit into the (i + 1)-th bit (which is given as input to the oracle), and its existence depends on the value of the unknown bit of S (or S 0 in the Trimming Rule). We solve this problem by performing the randomization with random values R < e such that r i = 0. In that case we are indeed guaranteed that in every query the bits left of the oracle's location are those of the random R. However now we cannot determine the value of the i-th bit simply by taking a majority vote, since it might not be the case that the oracle has any advantage over 1/2 in correctly predicting the i-th bit (based on the bits to its left) on half of the possible values as determined by our randomization. Instead we use the fact that if the oracle has probability signi cantly greater than 1/2 of correctly predicting the i-th bit (or in other words its probability of correct predictions is signi cantly greater than that of erroneous predictions) then its probability of correct 1-answers signi cantly di ers from that that of erroneous 1-answers: Pr(C(g; N; Z; x n i+1 ) = 1jx i = 1) ? Pr(C(g; N; Z; x n i+1 ) = 1jx i = 0) 2" It is possible to perform a-priori tests on C (using inputs with known x n i ) to determine the corresponding two probabilities. Thus instead of using the answers of the oracle to perform a majority vote, we estimate the relative frequency of the 1-answers with accuracy greater than ". (It is again easy to see that t(n) queries are su cient). By that we can derive the unknown value of x i .
Note that, as we have already observed, when performing the randomization for the Trimming Rule if none of the extreme values in the list (l 1 and l ) are the correct candidates, then we are not guaranteed that the d log ne bits right to s 0 cp are 0 and a carry may reach the oracle's location. We may therefore get that the frequency of 1-answers is altogether di erent from the two a-priori measured probabilities. In that case both values can be discarded from the list.
To extend the proof to the biased bits (using de nition H.5) we have to be slightly careful. Using the notations of the proof of Proposition 3.4 we argue as follows:
If the oracle behaves signi cantly di erently on I 2j+1 and I 2j+2 for any j when the correct bits for the left n ? i positions are given to the oracle (they are basically j with some zeroes in front) we are done by the same reasoning as in Lemma 4.1 (there are only polynomially many possibilities so we can try them all). The only time we can get into trouble is when K is even and most of the oracles advantage is when the left n ? i bits take their maximal value. Now create a \new" oracle C 0 by always feeding this maximal value of the n ? i bits to our original oracle (no matter if they are correct or not).
Note that by assumption P 0 1 (I K ) and P 0 1 (I K?1 ) are substantially di erent. Looking more closely at the proof of Proposition 3.4 one can make the following statement (with substantially di erent interpreted as \at least 1=poly(n) for a suitable polynomial poly(n)".):
For any oracle C such that P 1 (I K?1 ) and P 1 (I K ) are substantially di erent one of the following statements is true:
1. There is a j < K such that P 1 (I j?1 ) and P 1 (I j ) are substantially different. 2. There is a j < T such that P 1 (I j?1 K ) and P 1 (I j K ) are substantially di erent.
Using C 0 = C in this statement makes it straightforward to prove the theorem also in this case.
5 Applications

Commitment Schemes
Several cryptographic schemes require a party to commit to a certain message without revealing any information on the content of the message. The message is drawn out of an arbitrary collection, which may be very sparse. Most known commitment schemes are designed to hide a single bit. Multibit commitment improves the e ciency of existing protocols as presented in KMO] . Recently Naor has presented a multi-bit commitment scheme Na] using any pseudo-random bit generator. We construct a di erent scheme that uses f g;N directly.
The simultaneous security of the dn=2e right hand bits of f g;N implies that f g;N hides dn=2e uniformly distributed bits. To use f g;N in a multi-bit commitment scheme, it should be proven that f g;N hides O(n) arbitrarily distributed bits in a polynomially secure manner. We now formally de ne the notion of simultaneous security with respect to non-uniform probability distributions, prove that most of our results still hold under these distributions and construct a simple multi-bit commitment scheme accordingly.
(P ? 1)(Q ? 1) must be known to the party that chooses the commitment scheme, by carefully choosing the primes.
De nition BM]:
A prime P of size n is hard if P = tP 0 + 1, where P 0 is a prime and 1 < t < poly(n).
Since hard primes have an asymptotically polynomial density among the integers of the sequence tP 0 + 1 BM] hard primes can be found e ciently. The commitment protocol will be performed in practice using a Blum integer which is the product of randomly chosen hard primes, and its security will rely on a somewhat di erent assumption, namely that no family of polynomialsize Boolean circuits can factor a polynomial fraction of the Blum integers that are the product of hard primes. This might at rst sound like a stronger assumption, but in fact it is weaker, since if we can factor a non-negligible fraction of Blum integers which are the product of hard primes then we can factor a non-negligible fraction of all Blum integers, while the converse is not clearly true.
Pseudo-Random Bit Generation
Any one-way function can be used for the construction of a pseudo-random bit generator, due to the recent results of ILL] and H]. However, the general techniques are very ine cient. The simple construction of BM] is inapplicable to f g;N , since for composite N it is not one to one. f g;N is also not regular (i.e. not every possible value has the same number of preimages), hence even the (ine cient) construction of GKL] cannot be used. We are interested in an e cient construction, using the simultaneous security of dn=2e bits of f g;N to output as many bits as possible in every stage of the generation.
Using the Leftover Hash Lemma, presented in ILL] and IZ], we give a construction of an extender E : f0; 1g 3n ! f0; 1g 3:5n?O(log 2 n) . The pseudorandom bit generation is achieved through repeated applications of the extender to a random seed (as demonstrated in BH] ).
Let N = P Q be a Blum integer of size n and let g be an admissible high order generator. Let n ? O(log n) m n ? 2 be an integer such that 2 m ord N (g) < 2 m+1 . As before, hard primes must be used to nd m and ord N (g) in practice. Let H n;t be a family of universal hash functions, where t = m ? log be a random n-bit string. Let x dn=2e 1 denote the dn=2e right hand bits of X(modord N (g)) and let denote concatenation. The extender E is:
E(h X) = h h (f g;N (X)) x dn=2e 1 :
Note: The fact that O(n) bits of f g;N are simultaneously secure and not just O(log n) is crucial for the construction of E. Applying the hash function causes a log 2 n-bit loss in the length of E's output. The nal O(n) extension is possible only because of the many simultaneously secure bits, which more than compensate for this loss.
Theorem 8:
E is a perfect extender.
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Proof:
The proof is a direct result of the following two lemmas. Lemma 8.1: For randomly chosen h X, h h (f g;N (X)) is polynomially indistinguishable from a randomly chosen (2n + t)-bit string.
Proof: The hash functions are de ned on the set G, of elements in Z N that can be expressed as powers of g. In our construction the distribution of the elements in G is induced by a uniform probability distribution of X. Clearly, by de nition of ord N (g): min Z2G f? log(Pr(Z))g = log(ord N (g)) m
The lemma is then a straightforward application of the Leftover Hash Lemma ( Proof: Identical to the proof of Theorem 5. The only di erence results from the fact that the inputs to the oracle are not admissible triplets but g, N, h, h(f g;N (X)). Note that the fact that m is made public (through the publication of the range of h) does not detract from the security of x dn=2e 1 since it can be guessed in polynomial time (indeed we guess m in our shifting and randomization techniques).
Discussion
In this paper we have explored some of the unique properties of exponentiation modulo a Blum integer, which make it the rst number theoretic function all of whose bits are proven to be individually hard and half of whose bits are proven to be simultaneously hard. The results presented in this paper can be extended in several directions:
1. It is interesting to see which mixed groups of bits from the right and left half of f g;N can be proven to be simultaneously secure. We can show that the bits of the complement of every window of length bn=2c are simultaneously secure, i.e. for every 1 j dn=2e the rightmost j bits together with the leftmost dn=2e?j bits are simultaneously secure. In particular the rightmost dn=4e bits together with the leftmost dn=4e bits are simultaneously secure.
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2. The factorization of Blum integers may remain intractable even if some of the bits of P and Q are known. E cient factorization techniques are known only when at least dn=3e bits of P or Q are given RS] . Assume that the factorization of Blum integers remains computationally hard even when we are given the bn=4c leftmost non-zero bits of P or Q.
Under this strengthened intractability assumption it is easy to show that three quarters of the bits of f g;N are simultaneously secure, as the length of the unknown part of S is now only dn=4e + 1 instead of dn=2e + 1.
3. Let F denote any set of composites for which it is assumed that it is computationally hard to distinguish Blum integers from the numbers in F (and thus in particular it is di cult to factor these numbers). Such a set is, for example, the set of all composites N which are the products of a small number of large primes. Under this strengthened assumption our results hold not only for Blum integers but for all F as well, even though our proof techniques are not directly applicable to numbers in F. This generalization was rst observed by Silvio Micali (personal communication).
